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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right to Counsel-Where an investigation
has begun to focus upon a particular suspect, whose request for
counsel has been denied and who has not received a warning as to
his right to remain silent, he has been deprived of his rights under
the sixth amendment.
Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
In the recent case of Escobedo v. Illinois' the United States Supreme
Court decided a question left unanswered in the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright.2 An opportunity to determine the time and
circumstances when a right to counsel accrues was presented
by the facts which follow.
Danny Escobedo, after being questioned and released in connection
with the murder of his brother-in-law, was implicated by Benedict
DiGerlando then in police custody. While en route to the station
after the defendant's arrest, an officer informed him of DiGerlando's
statement. At the police station Escobedo made repeated requests
to see his attorney, all of which were denied. When Escobedo's
attorney arrived, he was refused permission to speak to his client.3
The attorney waited approximately three hours then left the homi-
cide bureau. During the interrogation, Escobedo was confronted
with his accuser and after calling him a liar said, "I didn't shoot
Manuel, you did it." 4 He thereafter made statements implicating him-
self in the murder plot.
Both before and during the trial, motions were made in an at-
tempt to suppress the incriminating statement. They were denied.
After his conviction the defendant appealed claiming that the con-
fession was inadmissible since it was obtained after his request for
counsel had been denied.
1. 84 Sup. Ct.'1758 (1964).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). .
3. li. R1v. Stat. ch. 38, §477 (1959) (now Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §736c
(1961)).
All public officers . . . having the custody of any person . . .for any
alleged cause whatever, shall, except in' cases of imminent-danger of
escape, admit any practicing attorney at law of this state, whom such
person so restrained of his liberty may desire to see or consult, to see
and consult such person so imprisoned, alone and in private, at the jail
or other place of custody; ....
4. The petitioner testified that he then made a statement because of
Officer Montejano's promise that "he would see to it that we would go home and
be held only as witnesses, if anything ....... Officer Montejano denied this.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision finding that
the statement was induced by a promise that the defendant would
be released and immune from prosecution if he gave a statement. 5
However, on rehearing, the conviction was affirmed. The court said,
"(T)he officer denied making the promise and the trier of fact be-
lieved him. We find no reason for disturbing the trial court's finding
that the confession was voluntary." 6 The Illinois Supreme Court
stated that the petitioner's testimony indicated "he did not rely on
this alleged promise when making the statement." 7 The court, re-
lying on authoritative decisions,8 held the confession was admissible
even though counsel was denied.
In a case decided on the same day as this decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court said:
Our conclusion is in no way foreclosed, as the State con-
tends, by the fact that the state trial judge or the jury may
have reached a different result on this issue.
It is well settled that the duty of constitutional adjudica-
tion resting upon this Court requires that the question
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been violated by admission into evidence of a
coerced confession be the subject of an independent de-
termination here, see, e.g. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 147-148, 'we cannot escape the responsibility of making
our own examination of the record,' Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 316. (Emphasis in original).9
The United States Supreme Court, granting -certiorari, recognized
the possible applicability of the fifth amendment 1 0 to Escobedo, but
declined to discuss it since the decision on the issue of right to
counsel was sufficient to constitute a reversal.
5. The officer, originally from the defendant's neighborhood, spoke to him in
Spanish. From the alleged conversation, an assupmtion that the officer was
sympathetic could be drawn, especially by the defendant..
6. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.2d 41, 46, 190 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1963).
7. Ibid.
8. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958).
9. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
10. "We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory
self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgment by the States." Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1964).
Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from obtaining a con-
fession through "sympathy falsely aroused," Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
323 (1959), and this emotional bond was created by one of the officers, the Court
could have decided the case on these grounds.
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Having eliminated the contention that the appeal must be de-
cided by viewing the facts as the trial court had, the Court then
discussed the right of the petitioner to have counsel present at the
investigation. It was argued that at this stage of the investigation
many confessions were obtained and that an attorney, advising his
client at this time, would diminish the number of confessions, but
the Court replied that the number of confessions obtained demon-
strates the need of the suspect to have legal advice. A practice of
reliance exclusively on self-incrimination by the suspect is unde-
sirable. "(H)istory amply shows that confessions have often been
extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of
obtaining valid and independent evidence .... ,11 Convictions should
be based on extrinsic evidence for "any system of administration
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-
disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby."1 2
This method of law enforcement, if administered in such a manner,
will obliterate the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and any
system which fears an accused learning of his rights and exercis-
ing them should not be permitted to survive.
Therefore, where the investigation has begun to focus on a partic-
ular individual in police custody and they interrogate him in order
to obtain a confession, if he has requested and been denied an op-
portunity to confer with counsel and has not been told of his con-
stitutional right to remain silent, he has been denied "the Assistance
of Counsel" in violation of the sixth amendment to the Constitution
as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,"''1 3 and the prosecution cannot use a statement obtained in
this manner at the trial.
The Court stated that a contrary holding is not a natural result
of Crooker v. California and Cicenia v. LaGay1 4 cited by the Illinois
Supreme Court in their decision of this case. 15
In Crooker, where the defendant was arrested for the murder of
his former employer, the court held that lack of counsel at the in-
terrogation was not prejudicial since he was aware of his rights. 1 6
The Court there refused to state that the denial of a request to
engage counsel is ipso facto a violation of due process. The lack of
11. Haynes v. Washington, supra note 9 at 519.
12. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940). (Emphasis in original).
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 2 at 340.
14. Supra note 8.
15. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 1.
16. Crooker had completed one year of law school which the Court felt gave
him sufflicient knowledge of the legal process.
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counsel must prejudice his case so that he was tried without the
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.
The Court, again in Cicenia, required lack of counsel to be prej-
udicial before it constituted a reversible error. Cicenia, after ac-
quiring counsel, surrendered to police officers. He was held incom-
municado and all efforts of his attorney to see him were abortive.
In this case, too, the Supreme Court said that all circumstances must
be examined to see if the conviction was basically unfair.
In both of the previous cases, the petitioner was asking for an
absolute rule that every denial of a request for counsel violated due
process. However, it is a violation only if the circumstances meet
the requirements set forth in the holding of the Supreme Court in
Escobedo. Any principle announced in Crooker or Cicenia, incon-
sistent with Escobedo, is no longer controlling. 17
The Court has evolved from the amoebic idea that to allow counsel
during the interrogation would seriously reduce police effectiveness.
Of course this rule will limit the number of confessions, but it will
guard an individual's rights even while charged with a crime. The
United States Supreme Court limited their holding in Escobedo to
the factual situation presented. Danny Escobedo requested counsel
and was not warned of his right to remain silent. These are the facts
that limit the scope of the decision.
If the Constitution grants the right to counsel, it should not be
dependent upon one's request. If there is a right to counsel, it should
be absolute. Of course, an individual may waive his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to counsel either at the pretrial stage
or at the trial if he so desires, 1 8 but if he is unaware of his rights
and does not request counsel, he should not be prejudiced by his
ignorance. Although the holding is within the confines of the factual
situation, the general overtone of the case and the statement "no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights"' 9 leads to the
conclusion that the suspect has a right to both the warning con-
cerning self-incrimination (fifth amendment) and effective rep-
resentation of counsel at all stages of the criminal proceeding (sixth
amendment). A failure, by the police, to inform the defendant of
his constitutional right to either of these basic protections may pre-
vent obtaining a conviction based on a voluntary confession.
FRANK A. MYSLIWIEC
17. Supra note 1.
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 1 at 1764.
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